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Abstract—Public administrations across Europe have been
actively following and adopting cloud paradigms at various
degrees. By establishing modern data centers and consol-
idating their infrastructures, many organizations already
benefit from a range of cloud advantages. However, there
is a growing need to further support the consolidation and
sharing of resources across different public entities. The
ever increasing volume of processed data and diversity of
organizational interactions stress this need even further,
calling for the integration on the levels of infrastructure,
data and services. This is currently hindered by strict
requirements in the field of data security and privacy.
In this paper, we present ongoing work aimed at enabling
secure private cloud federations for public administrations,
performed in the scope of the SUNFISH H2020 project. We
focus on architectural components and processes that estab-
lish cross-organizational enforcement of data security policies
in mixed and heterogeneous environments. Our proposal
introduces proactive restriction of data flows in federated
environments by integrating real-time based security policy
enforcement and its post-execution conformance verification.
The goal of this framework is to enable secure service
integration and data exchange in cross-entity contexts by
inspecting data flows and assuring their conformance with
security policies, both on organizational and federation level.
Keywords-cloud computing, federated environments, policy
enforcement, XACML, data security, data privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
A broad range of supporting tools, as well as ex-
tensive adoption of cloud-related technologies enabled
public administrations to consolidate their infrastructure
and use available resources more efficiently. Due to the
heterogeneity of approaches and the ever increasing need
for disposable processing power and storage, many orga-
nizations across Europe recognized the benefits to extend
private cloud reach beyond their infrastructures by involv-
ing structured and cross-entity collaboration flows. This is
particularly the case for public administrations who need
to process large amounts of data in short time periods, or
who need to perform data processing and data exchange
with a range of external entities. Strict requirements in
the field of data security and privacy, however, restrict the
applicability of such collaborations.
The current situation across Europe is that private cloud
data-centers from different public administrations are not
allowed to share computational resources. Therefore, large
data-centers are only fully utilized during peak times,
where e.g. a monthly calculation on massive data-sets
needs to be performed. The rest of the time the data-
centers have loads of spare resources. The overall goal
of the SUNFISH H2020 project is to address the lack of
technology that allows public sector entities to federate
their data centers, overcome legislative barriers and ef-
fectively utilize available computational resources. This
goal is approached by considering specific requirements
of these organizations and concentrating on security of
cross-entity collaborative workflows.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
We start with providing related work and background
information on the used technologies and mechanisms in
Section II. We continue with the description of the defined
use cases and our concrete contributions to the research
community in Section III. In Section IV we elaborate on
our contribution in federated intercloud security enforce-
ment followed by integration and deployment strategies
in Section V. Finally we discuss our results in Section VI
and conclude in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In the context of cloud computing, security flaws or
weaknesses on a low level can have impacts on dozens
of virtual machines, involving hundreds or thousands of
different users, compromising their privacy. Jansen [1]
identifies key security issues associated with cloud com-
puting:
• Trust: The security of data, or more generally the
security of resources is in hands of the cloud provider.
A tight trust relationship between the customer and
the cloud provider is required.
• Architecture: The use of completely virtualized envi-
ronments and resources provides large attack surfaces
out of control of the customer.
• Identity Management: Identity management in the
cloud, especially for federated clouds, is still subject
of research and one of the goals to achieve in the
SUNFISH project. As shown by Chow et al. [2] an
organizations authentication system may not scale to
the cloud without non-negligible effort.
• Software Isolation: Multi-tenancy and on-demand
resource provisioning in a cloud environment are
done utilizing virtualization technologies and execut-
ing various virtual machines on one single physical
machine. The isolation of different virtual machines,
different applications or just different users (depend-
ing on the utilized cloud deployment strategy) is
essentially impacted by the lower layers, like the
operating system kernel and hypervisor.
• Data Protection: For multi-tenant cloud environ-
ments, data for different tenants typically is stored
side-by-side, protected by the identity-based authen-
tication system, which still is a major issue in cloud
computing.
• Availability: Availability refers to the accessibility of
outsourced IT infrastructure at all times, covering,
amongst others, computing resources, data storage
and databases.
To counter these issues various approaches are analyzed
in the following sections.
A. Cloud Certifications
Cloud certifications provide certainty for end-users and
businesses regarding various factors when selecting a
cloud service provider. Certifications are voluntarily by its
nature, but uncertified cloud providers may not be consid-
ered by end-users due to higher complexity and required
effort to assess relevant factors. In fact certifications ease
the selection process by the end-user and create confidence
for the services and providers. Certification schemes have
been developed with a focus on various different domains.
In a survey conducted by the European Commission and
ENISA ”Certification schemes for cloud computing” [3]
covering the most established and thorough certification
schemes, a categorization of schemes was introduced:
General, Privacy/Data protection, Interoperability, Secu-
rity, Service Management and Reliability/Access. Using
this analysis and the matrices as provided by the ENISA
Cloud Certification Schemes Metaframework [4], the se-
lection of certification schemes for cloud providers and
customers is simplified.
B. Data Security
Data security in general needs to tackle the issue of
”who has access to resources/data“ in an access control
fashion, but may also go beyond dedicated access control
approaches. The decision if a particular entity has access
to a specific resource may be governed by additional
requirements. As a simple example, if a data holder allows
a certain group of entities to access its data, she may
additionally request to be informed each time the data is
accessed. Furthermore, another group of entities may only
be allowed to access the data in a masked way, where
certain sensitive details are not accessible anymore.
In the remainder of this section the current most
advanced approaches of data security policy definition
languages are analyzed and reviewed.
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) [5] is a standard maintained by the OASIS
consortium. It is designed to provide a language where
authorization policies can be specified in XML format
in a structured and hierachic way. XACML can be seen
as a de-facto standard on policy description languages
influencing other policy related works. It primarily
follows an attribute-based access control (ABAC)
approach, but a profile exists to meet the requirements
for ”core“ and ”hierachical“ role based access control
(RBAC) [6] systems. The XACML specification not
only specifies a policy language, but also components
related to the enforcement of these policies and their
interactions. XACML is targeted at enterprises which
want to decouple the security policy implementation from
their applications. All policies are stored in a single point
and can be updated easily. Furthermore, XACML offers a
consolidated view of the security policies in force for the
system administrators. The specification is not dedicated
to cloud or distributed environments, and needs adaption
for these environments in terms of component interactions
and regarding the distribution of components.
The Formal Access Control Policy Language
(FACPL) [7] is heavily inspired by XACML, but
provides a much more lightweight syntax with a solid
mathematical foundation. Ponder [8] introduces a more
fine grained categorization of access control policies
into: authorization policies, information filtering policies,
delegation policies and refrain policies. The Obligation
Specification Language (OSL) as introduced by Hilty et
al. [9] explicitly focuses on usage control of data. Usage
control is an extension of access control with a focus not
only on who may access the data, but also on how the
data may be used afterwards.
C. Efforts on European Level
On European level several funded projects have been
conducted with a focus on data- and cloud security. In
the Trusted Architecture for Securely Shared Services
(TAS3) [10] project a trusted architecture with adaptive
security services has been developed. Its focus lies on
next generation trust and security requirements, to enable
a dynamic management of user-centric policies. Further-
more, it enables an end-to-end and secure communication
channel for personal information between heterogeneous
systems.
The DEMONS [11] project addresses issues in mon-
itoring of the future Internet. It aims at building a de-
centralized and privacy-preserving cooperative monitoring
infrastructure to detect, report and mitigate network threats
in a cooperative manner.
The EnCoRe (Ensuring Consent and Revocation) [12]
project was a research project from the UK industry
and academia sector, with the focus to give individuals
more control over their personal information, by means of
defining what is allowed to happen to personal information
disclosed to organizations. In contrast to other approaches,
EnCoRe also focuses on the revocation problem, as for
other consent based systems, giving consent is a final deci-
sion and cannot be undone. As SUNFISH does, the project
also bases on the XACML approach. During the project
some enhancements to XACML were developed which
also influenced the developed SUNFISH approaches.
III. USE CASES AND CONTRIBUTIONS
The overall problem the SUNFISH project addresses is
the lack of infrastructure and technology, allowing public
sector players to federate their infrastructures and allow a
more efficient resource usage across different entities. To
demonstrate the feasibility of the targeted solution, three
use cases are defined and will be realized in the project.
A. Use Case 1 - Managing Salary Accounts
The General Administration, Personnel and Services
Department of the Italian Ministry of Economy and
Finance (MEF) are in charge of managing the payroll
functions for more than 1.5 million Italian public sector
employees. Managing a payroll system requires accessing
highly sensitive data (such as health, religious orientation,
information on military missions abroad) from multiple
public and private entities including banks, central and
local public administration or military agencies. All of the
involved entities have a high interest in maintaining their
client’s privacy.
The procedure of producing payslips follows a complex
workflow, which involves: (a) collecting data from relevant
public entities, (b) checking the data, (c) maintain client’s
privacy by only revealing necessary data to relevant en-
tities and (d) finally producing the payslips. This entire
process needs to be completed within predetermined time,
in order not to cause any delays in payment.
MEF cloud 
environment
MIN cloud 
environment
SUNFISH federated 
cloud environment
MEF zone
MIN zone Segregated zone
Shared zone
Figure 1. Use case 1 overview
The process currently in place involves multiple man-
ual interactions and requires each department to upload
prepared data files using the MEF payroll system to
start the approval process. Utilizing the features provided
by the SUNFISH federation this process is inherently
simplified. As outlined in Figure 1, using the Ministry
of Interior (MIN) as an example, the process should be
enhanced to enable the calculation procedure to directly
access the data on MIN systems and store data in en-
crypted or masked form in the internal system at MEF.
To do this, a part of the MIN system will be deployed
in the federated SUNFISH environment. This way, the
process of extracting data from the MIN systems and to
send them to the MEF systems is completely executed
within the SUNFISH federated environment. Data is no
more exposed outside the secured environment of MEF
or MIN and always remains protected. Depending on
security restrictions, permitted procedures in the federated
environment have the possibility to directly access the
source database. The segregated zone of the federation is
subject to strict restrictions in terms of access, to perform
computations on sensitive data. Sensitive data can only be
accessed in plain in this dedicated zone and therefore is
protected from unauthorized access.
B. Use case 2 - Financial Data Submission
The taxation department within the Ministry of Finance
(MFIN) in Malta requires taxpayers, employers, banks and
other third party data providers to submit information re-
lated to payroll, financial statements which qualify for de-
duction from chargeable income, receipts of payments and
other related information to the commissioner of revenue.
From medium-sized or large companies this information is
currently collected through spreadsheets or data files and is
submitted via web-site or web-services. Small businesses
still use the paper channel. The tax authorities are seeking
for a way to offer a software-as-a-service (SaaS) which
helps to generate and submitting the required information.
The SaaS solution should be integrated by using public
cloud providers, but still enabling and maintaining the
connectivity to private cloud providers.
The SUNFISH framework should enable the feder-
ation of resources between the MFIN cloud, public
cloud providers and other third party cloud (e.g. payroll
providers having their own data center).
On an abstract level the use case looks similar to use
case one from chapter III-A described in Figure 1 with
the difference that at least a third cloud environment, the
public cloud environment, is added to the federation.
C. Use case 3 - Secure Cloud Storage for Data
The South East Regional Cyber Crime Unit (SERCCU)
forms part of the UK response to cyber crime. The offenses
investigated focus on cyber-dependent and to a lesser
extent, cyber-enabled crime. Victims range from members
of public through small and medium sized businesses to
large corporations and government agencies.
The range of offenses investigated and the large geo-
graphical nature of internet-based investigations requires
close interaction with partner agencies. The SERCCU is
one of nine regional units and provides support to police
forces within the South East region. However, interaction
with other UK police forces is required on a case by
case basis. The SERCCU also operates on a national level
to assist the National Cyber Crime Unit, to investigate
and prosecute offenders often based in Europe and those
beyond European borders. In order to respond to dynamic
changes in technology and patterns of offending they also
need to work closely with industry and academia.
The unit obtains and stores large quantities of data
which is highly sensitive, including high-level corporate
information through to personal details about general
members of the public. It also seizes and is required to
securely store data produced from network servers and
personal digital storage devices. The unit’s investigations
will generate varying levels of intelligence, with each level
requiring differing handling conditions. At present, the
data is stored on a local server colocated within the unit
premises. There are some limitations to this setup, one
of which is that the server is not open to all the external
parties that SERCCU interacts with. In this way, the unit
is very limited in regards to data sharing which impacts
negatively on the collaboration required in this field of
work.
Law enforcement organizations need an effective way to
securely share intelligence related to online criminal activ-
ity with other law enforcement parties. In addition, those
organizations are increasingly sharing digital information
with third parties such as victim companies. If a system
were to be devised enabling sharing of digital information
and intelligence, then third party secure access in addition
to law enforcement agencies should be considered.
D. Requirements and Challenges
With a deep understanding of the use cases, a well-
established path was followed to identify assets, related
threats and finally derive requirements. This methodology
is state of the art. It is e.g. seen in standards like Com-
mon Criteria security certification (ISO/IEC 15408)[13]
of products, but also in organisations’ risk management
processes. In order to ensure completeness, the threat
modeling has undergone iterative cycles of revisiting each
step. Interviews with and reviews by domain experts have
been carried out to complement that threat modeling
team’s analysis by the practical experience of partners that
have comparable services in operation.
It is out of the scope of this document to repeat the
complete analysis. In summary, the result of the in-depth
analysis were 24 assets classified into six categories:
users, federated environment, data, computational logic,
operation, and infrastructure. Furthermore, 21 threats were
identified, putting these assets in danger. The result were
32 requirements targeting the protection of the assets
classified into four categories: general requirements, data
requirements, federated environment requirements and us-
ability requirements
On the infrastructure level the requirements target the
integration of existing infrastructures and avoid building
silos. The same applies on a software-layer. Existing appli-
cations should be able to run in the SUNFISH federation.
From a data security perspective, the requirements target
the self-determination of data providers. Even though
data is stored within the SUNFISH federation, the data
provider still requires full control of its data. This also
enables cross-border use cases where regulations hinder
the transfer of sensitive data in plain.
This work focuses on the data security related aspects of
the discussed use cases. The developed solution will use
the XACML policy description language as a basis for
defining policies, and the specified components as a basis
for the enforcement infrastructure. This decision raises the
following challenges:
• Integration of various different technologies: SUN-
FISH is a heterogeneous system where different
technologies from various enterprises work together:
The cloud federation contains resources operated with
different technologies, services need to communicate
with each other regardless of the used technology,
applications (legacy or dedicated SUNFISH applica-
tions) need to operate seamlessly. The challenge is to
integrate all the different services and resources and
make them available seamlessly.
• Identity Management: All enterprises have their own
identity management systems, the challenge is to
integrate these systems without replicating identity
information, but still being able to cross-reference
identities for policy definition.
• Interoperability: Applications and services need to
run on the provided infrastructure regardless of the
used hardware and technology.
• Live transformation: The use cases may require that
sensitive data is masked or encrypted before it is
stored outside secured environments. The transforma-
tion capabilities are provided by services within the
SUNFISH federation. A near real-time transforma-
tion is required. This is challenging especially when
it comes to large data-sets.
• Identification of gaps and extensions of standards:
Currently no data security policy languages for het-
erogeneous distributed environments are available,
where each data provider remains in full control of
its data.
E. Contributions
In this section an overview of the contributions in this
work is given.
Overall, a new security model is introduced, the zoned
approach. In this model, the federation is grouped into
zones with equal requirements on data security. On the
edge of the zone, transparent gateways govern the access
to and from other zones. The model is scrutinized in
Section IV. From a data security perspective this work
extends the XACML approach in multiple ways:
• XACML is extended to operate across enterprise bor-
ders. Data or resources in the system are associated
with policies, the control of the policies remains in
data providers’ hands.
• The result of an XACML request, according the
current specification, either is permit, deny or indeter-
minate. Another mechanism exists called obligation
to induce further actions. This mechanism is extended
to support data-security-related operations like data
masking, data encryption or logging. This enables
the integration of services in the enforcement process
without applying any restrictions on the implementa-
tion.
• The enforcement components are extended to act as
gateways and seamlessly enforce the defined policies,
also for applications unaware of the XACML infras-
tructure.
• A decentralized decision process is foreseen, also to
perform the decision-making at premises under the
control of the data provider.
Beside data security related contributions a federated
identity management model is elaborated, as an abstrac-
tion for the enterprise’s identity management systems.
The identity management model provides a mapping of
enterprise identities to common SUNFISH roles. This
way policies can be specified only referring to abstracted
credentials, without knowing the details about enterprise-
provided identity management systems.
IV. INTERCLOUD SECURITY ENFORCEMENT
Intercloud security enforcement in heterogeneous en-
vironments is a challenging task, due to the different
possible interactions in the system. Our proposed zoned
security model enables tenants to scale their required level
of security. In the following sections, we introduce our
general SUNFISH framework and go into detail on the
enforcement infrastructure and policy evaluation process.
A. SUNFISH Framework
In this chapter we briefly introduce the general SUN-
FISH framework and introduce our zoned security model.
Figure 2 shows a basic overview of the SUNFISH frame-
work and on which cloud service level (first column)
particular components are operating. The second column
lists potential users of components on this level. For this
work the Identity Management, Data Security and the
vertical transformation components are relevant.
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Figure 2. SUNFISH Framework
The federation generally is composed of multiple mem-
ber clouds. Each entity (e.g. organization) which wants to
use computing resources from the federation is called a
tenant. A tenant acquires computing resources, adhering to
certain rules (e.g. location of data center, operator of data
center, regulations,...) to run services or applications. The
computing resources are then isolated from other tenant’s
resources.
Based on this assignment we introduce our so-called
zoned security model, where the data security component
plays a major role in the realization. A zone is a collection
of computing resources which operate on data with the
same sensitivity-level. Each zone has a logical gateway
which inspects all requests going out of or coming into the
zone and enforces the defined policies. A simple example
is a two-part calculation, where the first part operates
on sensitive data and the more intensive second part on
uncritical data. To realize this application a tenant deploys
two zones with two services, one zone contains highly
trustworthy computing resources which perform the first
part of the calculation on the sensitive data and then
forwards the data to the second service in another zone
for the second part of the calculation. This zone is not
qualified to operate on sensitive data, therefore the gateway
masks the data before forwarding. This way sensitive data
is never processed unprotected on unqualified computing
resources.
Following this approach we are able to map complex
data security requirements to heterogeneous cloud envi-
ronments.
B. Enforcement Components
The security enforcement architecture follows and ex-
tends the approach proposed in RFC 2904 [14] and RFC
3838 [15], based on a general XACML data flow and
enforcement model [5]. In this sense our architecture relies
on the following components:
1) Policy Decision Point (PDP): evaluates requests and
security policies, providing decisions and guidance
to other components in the federated environment
2) Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): intercepts requests
and enforces policy decisions made by the PDP,
which may range from traditional access control
decisions or more advanced transformational in-
structions
3) Policy Adminstration Point (PAP): used to create
and administer security policies in the federation
4) Policy Information Point (PIP): provides attributes,
contextual and environmental parameters used in
access evaluation and the decision process
5) Policy Retrieval Point (PRP): stores the policies and
acts as retrieval and synchronization point for other
actors, such as the PDP and PAP
6) Data Transformation Service (DTS): a range of
components used to analyze or transform the data
intercepted by the PEP
The deployment of these components is illustrated in
Figure 3. In this scenario, PEP acts as a transparent
gateway deployed on the edge of each zone. Its task is
to intercept each request coming to or originating from
its subsumed zone. For this purpose, PEP interacts with
other components in the system, such as associated PDP
for policy evaluation, or PIP to gather the contextual
parameters necessary for policy evaluation.
In the simplest case, PEP denies or grants access
to data or services. More complex cases include real-
time data transformation performed on particular parts of
documents, potentially involving the execution of DTS
components, for each part of a workflow or operation that
is executed on intercepted data.
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Figure 3. Deployment of enforcement components
C. Security Policies
We here briefly explain security policies, how they
are instantiated and administered (to be reused in later
sections).
Security policies in the proposed framework formalize
and establish data security requirements, considering in-
teractions and activities occurring in the scope of inter-
cloud service integration, data sharing, and processing.
Security policies hence consider the requirements from the
view of the whole federation, its member organizations, as
well as applicable legal frameworks and additional user
requirements.
The data security framework relies on the concept
of policy sets, policies and rules. Defined at lowest
granularity-level, a rule represents a basic unit of a se-
curity specification that establishes relationships between
resources, subjects, operations and contextual conditions.
Integrated using a combination algorithm, a set of rules
forms a policy, a basic unit for security evaluation and en-
forcement in the system, which can be further aggregated
in policy sets.
In Figure 4 we present an illustrative abstract policy
consisting of one rule and based on attributes that charac-
terize each of the considered perspectives. An essential
building block of security policies is an obligation, a
specification included in authorization decisions describ-
ing operations that must be performed by the enforcement
point prior releasing or denying access to particular re-
sources or contexts. In the example provided in Figure
4, the obligation includes masking a data resource by
applying a masking context that corresponds to a particular
transaction.
Allow access to resource R with attributes {R1,…,Rn} 
  If action A is read 
  and subject S matches attributes {S1,…,Sn}
  and context C matches attributes {C1,…,Cn}
with obligation 
  on Permit: doMaskResource(M*(R,A,S,C) and doLog(…)
  on Deny: doLog(…) 
Figure 4. Abstract security policy
D. Cross-tenant Communication
The Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), deployed in each
zone separately, is responsible for both the incoming and
the outgoing traffic of the zone, performing active data
flow inspection that assures the conformance with the
federation and tenant-specific security policies.
To perform the access evaluation (including obligations)
at the PDP component, PEP needs to issue an authoriza-
tion request for each transaction that crosses the edge of
the zone. In this process, PEP collects the necessary data
and contextual parameters from the application and intra-
zone PIP, finally preparing an authorization request and
submitting it to the associated PDP for evaluation. The
originating application request may be performed only
after such decision is provided by the PDP.
APP_A PEP PEP PDP APP_ZPEP
Federated Zone A Shared Zone Federated Zone B
1 2
3
4
5
Figure 5. Cross-tenant interactions
Figure 5 depicts a flow between the entities in the frame-
work, which for the purpose of simplification excludes PIP
and DTS components inside a zone.
Based on the description provided in the figure, fol-
lowing steps describe the interaction process between
ApplicationA in ZoneA and ApplicationZ in ZoneB :
1) AppA prepares and issues a request, which is inter-
cepted by the local PEPA
2) PEPA identifies the originating application, estab-
lishes the assurance level and gathers the contextual
data from the PIPA. At this point PEPA completes
and issues the authorization request to PDPSZ .
3) PEPSZ intercepts the incoming request and for-
wards it to the PDPSZ , which evaluates the request
and provides the decision to PEPA. This decision
may include obligations to reduce the information
footprint by applying transformational operations.
4) Instructed by PDPSZ , PEPA forwards the request
to PEPB , which gathers the contextual data and
issues a new authorization request to PDPSZ .
5) Following the evaluation performed by PDPSZ ,
PEPB follows the instructions, performs necessary
actions and delivers the request to AppZ .
The presented workflow enables the dynamic and trans-
parent enforcement of security policies that are evaluated
at run-time, based on a particular context and actors’
attributes.
E. Data Transformation
Data sharing between zones may require data transfor-
mation to a view that in a context-specific manner reduces
information provided to adjacent party. The primary pur-
pose of this transformation is the enforcement of organiza-
tional policies that deal with information security, privacy
protection, and legislative compliance. Performed by Data
Transformation Service (DTS), a component deployable in
each zone, this processing can be applied before the data
leaves its origin, or before the data reaches its destination
environment. This component acts as a service, exposing
its functionality to local systems and its PEP on the edge
of the zone. In both directions it acts as an intermediary,
providing the data only in the view that is necessary to
accomplish the task and conform to legal or organizational
requirements [17], [18].
The primary use case considers the deployment of DTS
in a segregated zone, with the aim to provide the following
functions: (a) encryption and decryption, (b) data masking
and tokenization and (c) key and tokenization management
There are basically two approaches for integration of DTS.
The first approach is a PEP centered approach, where
the PEP performs all the interactions with the DTS.
This scenario is appropriate for cases that assume data
processing in batches or work on smaller data sets. For the
applications that require data-streaming and the processing
of big data sets, the intermediary role of PEP might require
additional resources or could add unacceptable overhead
to complete the processing cycle. These cases can be
addressed with the second approach.
The second approach assumes the deployment of DTS
in a proxy configuration, acting as an unidirectional inter-
mediary between PEP and the internal processing services.
The DTS is meant to be accessed as a service, with
the exposed functionality for each type of supported pro-
cessing through transformation interfaces. In its practical
realization, this service might integrate or depend on other
services and components.
This component may support the transformation of data
in both directions. The first case considers transforming
the data to their privacy-preserving equivalent for a par-
ticular service and purpose like tokenization of structured
data, with the goal to remove personally identifiable infor-
mation. The second case considers the reverse operation
with the purpose to get the data in its original form.
This functionality, however, depends on the particular
transformation type and might not be available for all
transformations. One example of reverse transformation
is the decryption of previously encrypted (transformed)
data. In this case, the service outputs decrypted data, for
the purpose of local processing.
F. Proactive Monitoring
The proposed framework integrates various subsystems
using different interfaces, where each component performs
a particular and isolated task in a broader workflow. In
order to gain an aggregate view of all the flows and
processing that occur across the systems, the proposed
framework includes additional component, responsible for
monitoring events, their correlation and integration into
coherent views for the purpose of separate analysis.
The monitoring component consists of a remote agent
and a central processing service. This service can po-
tentially be replicated to meet performance and security
requirements. The agent is attached to other components
in the system, such as PEP, PDP or DTS, intercepting
and logging their activity. By gathering and correlating
event-related data, the processing service is able to identify
anomalies in the system. In addition to that, the monitoring
component can be used to verify the functionality and
correctness of particular services by correlating processing
results obtained in different contexts and under separate
environments. This way, the correctness of authorization
evaluation performed in the scope of PDP, or data masking
performed by DTS, can be verified in near-real time.
V. DEPLOYMENT AND INTEGRATION
A. Integrating Applications
Integrative potential of applications and services de-
ployed in federated zones may differ in a range of fea-
tures. In particular cases of legacy, costly-to-maintain or
applications that exhibit a fair level of complexity, the
adjustments and integration in the federated framework
may introduce additional overheads in terms of integration
costs and security. For this reason the proposed framework
considers that PEPs may take one of two principal roles:
1) Transparent intercepting entity acting as a proxy
2) Intermediate service for framework-aware and cus-
tomized applications
PEP PEP
Federated Zone A Federated Zone B
GET /list_employees.xml HTTP1.1
Host: app_z.sunfishfederation
Date: Thu, 05 Jan 2015 11:31:41 
GMT
Header
Body
APP_A
POST /request HTTP1.1
Host: pep_a.sunfishfederation
Date: Thu, 05 Jan 2015 11:31:40 GMT
Issuer: {…}
Audience: {…}
RequestParams: {…}
RequestData: {…}
Other Header Fields
Body
1a
APP_Z
Inspecting request – PDP and PIP
1b
2
Figure 6. PEP interactions
In the first case, applications from the internal zone are
part of the intercloud federation but their awareness of the
processes and general integration level are reduced to a
minimum. This scenario is suitable for legacy and complex
applications that need to be integrated in a framework in
cost-effective manner. Such applications do not have to
implement additional protocols to support their integration
in federated environment. Instead, they may issue the
requests in a standard way, allowing PEPs to transparently
intercept and process them in accordance with security
policies and workflow prioritization, as defined in config-
uration environment and decided at run-time.
In the second approach, the PEP acts as an intermediate
service. Applications are aware of the federation frame-
work, actively integrating its flows and functionalities in
their workflow. Such applications can utilize the feder-
ated framework and its functions in full extent, allowing
the integration of dynamic, application-specific claims at
request-time.
Figure 6 depicts interactions between AppA and AppZ
considering both models. The first model, illustrated as
(1a), presents a request issued by originating application
that is not aware of federation environment. This request
is intercepted by PEPA and transformed to conform to
framework’s flows. For this purpose PEPA may gather
configuration data from local PIP in order to make requests
compatible with the intermediate components and target
application.
The model denoted as (1b) illustrates the flow initiated
by framework-aware applications. In this case APPA
directs its request to PEPA and its endpoint, consuming
the functions, options and headers available in the feder-
ation framework. This way, the application may augment
settings provided for dynamic adjustment. Upon receiving
such request, PEP and its adjacent PDP are able to evaluate
dynamic, application and context-specific requirements
and act upon them in an adaptive manner.
B. Cross-request Authorization
The standard flows, as introduced in Section IV-D and
depicted in Figure 5, assume the generation and evaluation
of authorization requests for each interaction separately.
Some collaborative flows may introduce excessive amount
of repeating requests that include a limited range of
replicated and similar requests. Such environment may
benefit from aggregated authorization request and reponses
that span across several interactions.
In the scope of this work we introduce the concept
of cross-request authorization that enables PEPs to issue
authorization requests, and PDPs to provide authoriza-
tion responses spaning across multiple transactions. These
trasactions may conform to particular requirement based
on relaxed requirements or activity context.
The first example of such cases applies particularly
to batch processing of huge amounts of data, involving
interactions between the same entities. Instead of adding
processing overhead for each request, a PDP may decide to
frame the conditions to a particular workflow and instruct
PEPs to enforce its decision to a range of requests.
The same flow can be applied to a range of activities.
These include interactions between parts of the monitoring
infrastructure, the security governance infrastructure or
configuration data flows.
C. Decentralized and Distributed Policy Decision
The model introduced in Section IV-D primarily consid-
ers the existence of a centralized PDP, deployed in a shared
zone, which represents a recommended approach for a
federation of entities. However, additional requirements
may arise building on complex configurations, use-cases or
employed trust models. We identify two main deployment
and integration models that specifically address additional
requirements from domains of security and performance
optimization.
The decentralized deployment and integration model
considers the possibility to utilize several shared zones,
and as part of them, different PDPs. In this scenario,
PEPs issue authorization requests to disparate PDPs in
parallel and enforce their decisions in terms of composite
and consesus-based evaluation. The rules determining the
endpoints for decision requests, their applicability and
scopes, as well as suitable cases and combinatorial logic
to be used, are stored in the common framework con-
figuration and are dynamically replicated to zone-specific
configuration registers across the federation. These rules
are provided to each component on initialization time with
changes dynamically pushed in real-time.
Applicable cases supporting the integration of this sce-
nario include additional security requirements, enabling
evaluation of rules to be done by distinct parties or
infrastructural components. This may reduce risks from
potentially compromised and manipulated governance in-
frastructure components. Furthermore, enabling PEPs to
acquire several PDPs may be used as a load-balancing
mechanism to adhere to performance related requirements.
The distributed deployment model considers zone-
specific and local deployment of PDPs, assigning them
with the responsibility to handle all authorization requests
coming from their perimeters.
This model raises two additional requirements. First, the
policies residing in a centralized repository in a shared
zone need to be dynamically synchronized to each zone.
These policies represent a subset of the global federated
policies, considering only the ones that are relevant for the
particular local environment. The relevancy of policies is
determined by the centralized PAP.
This second requirement introduces layered authoriza-
tion by establishing dependencies of local PDPs to the
centralized PDP for types or scopes of requests that cannot
be decided locally. Thus, in selected cases or undecidable
requests, locally deployed, zone-specific PDPs issue addi-
tional authorization requests to centralized PDPs and use
their results in the local decision process.
The distributed deployment model is particularly bene-
ficial for federations esablished across distant or resource-
limited networks. By increasing the levels of resilience and
scalability, this model supports the scenarios that include
highly variable loads with massive spikes in authorization
requests, as well.
D. Identity Management
One of the dependencies that enable effective enforce-
ment of security policies in federated environments refers
to the integration of the identity management systems.
This integration enables the security governance platform
to derive data on collaborating entities, their roles and
permissions in regards to resources and services, and to
include this information in the overall process of the access
decision. In the proposed framework we acknowledge
the fact that the cloud federation consists of entities
from various organizations, using diverse internal policies,
techniques and models for authentication. For the purpose
of successful operation, this data needs to be integrated,
translated and provided both to the critical security gov-
ernance components and adjacent collaborating entities.
Based on the use cases presented in Section III, the
primary type of interactions ocurring in the scope of the
federation framework include automated data processing
and request execution, triggered mainly by automated
application flows. Focusing on transactions taking place
in cross-zone and cross-domian context, we identify two
main categories of interactions and involved actors:
1) Accesses initiated in the scope of interactive sessions
controlled by human operators - users
2) Accesses initiated by automated agents that perform
background tasks independently of human actions
In this section we introduce both categories and estab-
lish distinction points relevant for their integration.
User-driven interactions encompass activities initiated
by users registered either on the level of federation, or
on the level of its individual members. Considering that
each federation member may run and maintain its own
identity management system, the common framework does
not aim to impose particular requirements to the flows that
occur inside its infrastructure. This framework, however,
considers identity management as a common functionality
additionally provided at the level of federation. The pro-
posed framework, therefore, aims to enable the integra-
tion of existing and heterogeneous identity management
systems present at the member level, with the purpose
of enabling 1) cross-zone user-driven interactions, and
2) federation-level administrative operations on common
framework components.
The approach proposed in the SUNFISH framework
relies on RBAC administrative model [16], establishing the
roles on the level of federation. The roles are assigned to
users in the scope of interactions with common framework
components or federation member services that request
users to be authenticated in common role. For this purpose,
the PIP component introduced in Section IV-B is used as
an intermediary entity that integrates with the local identity
management system, providing authentication assertions
and role translation defined in the common framework.
Agent-based interactions enclose the flows executed be-
tween federated services in cross-zone context, effectively
establishing machine-to-machine communication. In con-
trast to user-driven interactions, these flows are subjected
to deep inspection and transformation performed by the
PEP at the edge of the zone. Hence, the local PEP, in
coordination with the local PIP, ensures the authentication
of applications, providing assertions to adjacent parties in
the federation.
Figure 7 illustrates the process of authenticating appli-
cations using SAML protocol. In the first step, APPA
issues a request to APPB from ZoneB . PEP transpar-
ently intercepts the request and, after fetching application
specific configurations from local PIP, redirects APPA
(2) to the local identity provider administered by one of
the federation members. After performing this process,
the PEP receives the assertion (3), and transforms and
APP_A
Federated Zone A
PEPPIP
POST /request HTTP1.1
Host: app_b.zone_b.sunfish
Date: Thu, 05 Jan 2015 11:31:44 GMT
Content‐type: application/xml
<xml>
<Request>
<name>John Smith</name>
<salary>1050.20</salary>
<currency>EUR</currency>
</Request>
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://
idp.zoneA?SAMLRequest=XYZ%
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://
pep.zoneA?SAMLResponse=UIO%
1
IdP
2
3
4
1
Figure 7. SAML-based authentication for cross-zone flows
forwards the initial request to the target zone (4). The
simplified response sent to other party is shown in Fig-
ure 8. This response, delivered to PEPB , includes the
assertion prepared and signed by PEPA, as well as the
original request which may be subject to data masking,
data tokenization or data encryption1. Besides SAML, the
proposed framework includes the support for OpenID
Connect and key-based authentication flows.
POST /incoming HTTP1.1
Host: pep_b.sunfish
Date: Thu, 05 Jan 2015 11:31:44 GMT
Content‐type: application/json
Issuer: {"zone":"zonea", "entity":"pep_a", "source":{"entity":"app_a"}}
Audience: {"targetZone":"zoneb", "targetService":"se28ajs"}
Validity: {"notValidBefore":1450115468, "notValidAfter":1450115468} 
Context: {"anonymized":true, "authenticated":true, "authdata": {...},
  "masking":{"masking‐context":"c8102e"}}
RequestData: {"method":"POST", "host":"app_b.zone_b.sunfish",      
  "path":"/request", "content‐type":"app/xml", 
  "headers" : {"header1":"x", "header2":"y"} }
Signature {"type":"jwt","value":"eyJhcI..." } 
<xml>
<Request>
<name></name>
<salary>1050.20</salary>
<currency>EUR</currency>
</Request>
Figure 8. Transformed request delivered to the adjacent zone
VI. DISCUSSION
In this work we approached the topic of security in fed-
erated clouds from the perspective of cross-organizational
collaborations. Emanating from project-specific use cases,
requirements of public administrations and general data
protection legislation, this perspective puts strong focus
on objectives of data security and privacy. Serving as
a starting point for other requirements, these objectives
represent prerequisites for a broader adoption of cloud
services and establishment of more efficient, structured
and trusted collaboration workflows across public entities.
This work addresses the challenges elaborated in Sec-
tion III-D by relying on holistic and integrative principles.
The latter is employed by introducing and extending
a range of building blocks that provide complementary
functionalities, enabling synergistic mixture of their fea-
tures. This way, we combine real-time enforcement of
security policies with their post-executional conformance
verification performed in a separate context on a replicated
infrastructure, as introduced in Section IV-F. The resulting
reliance on multiple verification processes deployed at
distinct premises reduces the attack surface and provides
1Interaction is omited in figure for the purpose of simplification
an additional confidence layer covering the security en-
forcement. The same applies to the decentralized deploy-
ment, described in Section V-C, which enables parallel
evaluation of security policies across different federated
members. Incorporated and executed in a transparent man-
ner, these two approaches together strengthen security of
collaborative processes in the federation.
The challenge of data protection, approached by Schnei-
der’s least privilege principle [17] and formulated in a
range of legislations [18], is addressed by relying on a
range of technologies. Namely, the proposed framework
implements data protection by reducing information foot-
print in cross-domain interactions, allowing the actors
to consume only minimal and allowed data sets. This
process is supported by applying techniques such as data
masking, tokenization or anonymization, or alternatively,
by protecting structured data parts with the application of
format preserving or standard encryption techniques.
The integrative principle in the framework is demon-
strated with lightweight and transparent deployment of
existing technologies and heterogeneous systems. In this
sense, optional transparent policy enforcement for legacy
applications allows this category to benefit from security
functionalities with a minimal integrational overhead. Sim-
ilarly, the identity management subsystem presented in
Section V-D allows transparent reuse of existing systems
and infrastructure, supporting authentication of agents and
users, as well as integrity and assurance of the flows.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Public administrations are progressively adopting a
diverse range of cloud technologies, actively benefiting
from increased efficiency, reliability, and control of their
infrastructures. Growing amount of data that needs to be
processed in short time periods and provided to other
organizations impose the need to share infrastructure and
execute collaborative processes in a cross-domain manner.
In this paper, we presented an ongoing work that enables
these goals by establishing private cloud federations for
public administrations. Extending a range of standards and
technologies, the proposed framework considers a range of
additional requirements in terms of data security and pri-
vacy. In the scope of future work, we intend to validate the
proposed framework by employing the prototype currently
in development in three use cases that encompass public
organizations in three European countries.
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